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entire region will be increasingly in-
volved in dealing with a more ambi-
tious and yet dissatisfied Communist
state, since China still recalls the humil-
iations of the nineteenth century when
it was ‘sliced’ like a melon among rival
imperialists and still shares disputed
land and sea borders with many coun-
tries.” America’s potential problems
with China have been exacerbated in
recent years by the disappearance of the
European powers from Southeast Asia,
Hong Kong, and Macao, and the pre-
cipitous decline of Russia in Northeast
Asia, making China the only “possible
contender for the American laurels.”
Buckley, a Hong Kong–born, British-
educated, and Japan-based scholar, is
generally friendly to the United States
and supportive of its East Asian poli-
cies. However, he has his fair share of
criticism for U.S. policy makers, in par-
ticular Franklin Roosevelt’s “casual-
ness” in his dickering with Stalin at
Yalta, Harry Truman’s huge military re-
ductions immediately prior to the Ko-
rean War, and Lyndon Johnson’s and
Richard Nixon’s “humiliating” defeat in
Vietnam. In the near term, Buckley
warns, in addition to remaining the
bulwark of Asia Washington must initi-
ate wider regional interdependence
among East Asian countries. Asian na-
tions, instead of focusing on the United
States as the Holy Grail for everything
from democracy to human rights to
capitalism, might do better to look at
“British, European and Anglo-Pacific
approaches to such issues” in order to
spread their cultural horizons. To the
extent that “globalization is frequently
equated with Americanization,” Buck-
ley warns, the Asia-Pacific region may
one day resent such influence as an un-
welcome American intrusion.
This book went to press immediately
before “9/11” and the war on terror. As
a result, Buckley underestimates Japan’s
potential naval contribution to any
multinational military effort, suggesting
instead that “Japan appears most un-
likely to deploy its so-called self-defense
forces for anything much beyond the
rescue of its own citizens in emergency
situations abroad.” Buckley’s emphasis
on the close interaction and interde-
pendence of U.S. security and economic
policies throughout the Asia-Pacific re-
gion are, however, as relevant now as
ever. Buckley concludes by warning
that Americans must energetically face
up to the myriad of risks—chief among
them the growing threat from China—




Knox, MacGregor and Williamson Murray, eds.
The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050.
New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001. 203pp.
$28
The editors of this slim volume of es-
says have wide ambitions. In 194 pages
of text, they seek to define the nature
of military revolutions; describe the
tripartite sources of the concept in the
still-controversial work of historian
Michael Roberts on seventeenth-
century European land warfare, Soviet
military theory, and studies by Andrew
W. Marshall’s Office of Net Assessment;
and critique contemporary develop-
ments in American ground and air war-
fare. Furthermore, to support their
arguments, Knox and Murray present
case studies from seven centuries of
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armed conflict in the West. Between
their introductory essay on the concept
of a revolution in military affairs (RMA)
and their concluding analysis of the
shortcomings of the “American RMA,”
Knox and Murray place eight chapters
on historical examples of military revo-
lutions. There is one essay each by
Knox and Murray (on the French Revo-
lutionary army and the German blitz-
krieg, respectively). The others are by
equally prominent military historians:
Clifford J. Rogers on fourteenth-
century military developments under
England’s Edward III; John A. Lynn on
Louis XIV’s army; Mark Grimsley on
the U.S. Civil War; Dennis E. Showalter
on the mid-nineteenth-century Prus-
sian army; Holger H. Herwig on
changes in naval warfare, 1885–1914,
exemplified by the British and Ger-
mans; and Jonathan B. A. Bailey on the
creation of modern warfare in World
War I. The accuracy, comprehensive-
ness, and thoughtfulness of every essay
are outstanding—a rare achievement
in an anthology. The editors deserve
commendation.
Each part of this volume is excellent,
yet Knox and Murray have set them-
selves such a daunting goal—to inte-
grate coherently arguments based on
episodes of Western military history
with contemporary defense policy anal-
ysis—that they fall somewhat short.
While all the essays are fine offerings,
Rogers’s essay fits awkwardly alongside
case studies of RMAs from the time of
Louis XIV to the present, and Herwig’s
accentuates the absence of other essays
on the transformations of naval warfare
in the age of sail and after 1918. Histori-
cal examples drawn almost exclusively
from British, French, German, and
American military history suggest a
certain cultural bias; the selection ne-
glects significant contributions over the
past four and a half centuries to trans-
forming western military theory and
practice by the Dutch, Danes, Swedes,
Spanish, Italians, Poles, and Russians.
Since the editors stress the Soviet con-
tribution to the RMA concept, their
failure to include a Red Army case
study seems egregious. The origins of
the book in papers delivered at a small
conference at Quantico in 1996 help ex-
plain its limitations. Nonetheless, a
work of such ambitious intellectual
scope would have benefited from dou-
ble or even triple the number of chap-
ters, with a greater geographical and
topical inclusiveness.
Paradoxically, this reviewer’s disap-
pointment arises from the great contri-
butions this book does make to
understanding RMAs and redirecting
present American efforts to achieve
one. As all the authors emphasize, and
as Knox and Murray reiterate in their
conclusion, military revolutions are not
actually based on technology. In fact, an
RMA can occur without major techno-
logical innovation at all, as in late-
eighteenth-century France. Instead, a
military revolution is a reshaping of
military institutions to solve strategic
and political challenges. Adopting new
weapons and equipment alone, without
institutional reconfiguration, produces
armies such as the British and French
fielded against the Wehrmacht in May
1940. The editors present convincing
arguments that the U.S. military has
adopted new technologies without
interservice integration or, far more im-
portant, without attempts to relate
weapons systems, doctrine, force struc-
ture, and training to the strategic prob-
lems facing the nation. In mitigation,
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Knox and Murray admit that achieving
an RMA in the absence of an identifi-
able foe as the focus of strategy presents
enormous difficulties. Be that as it may,
they warn, the obstacle the United
States presents to the ambitions of enti-
ties outside the Western alliance could
make it the object of someone else’s
RMA. Perhaps that is the greatest warn-
ing to arise from the coincidental ap-
pearance of this book following 11
September 2001. The Dynamics of Mili-
tary Revolution raises critical questions
about how the United States might re-
shape its military to counter strategies
based on asymmetrical warfare. Beyond
the valuable contribution the book
makes to military history, one hopes
this volume will also help shape the na-




Gilbert, Marc Jason, ed. Why the North Won the
Vietnam War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2002. 254pp. $69.95
Since the fall of Saigon in the spring of
1975, Americans have sought to under-
stand how their government could have
lost the Vietnam War. Given the enor-
mous gap in resources between the
United States and the Vietnamese revo-
lutionaries, it is difficult for even schol-
ars of the war to explain why this
nation’s mighty military machine failed
to defeat its enemy’s forces. Many who
have written about the war have fo-
cused on the alleged mistakes of Ameri-
can civilian and military leaders,
arguing that more enlightened policies,
such as fewer restrictions on military
operations or more emphasis on pacifi-
cation, would have turned the tide in
South Vietnam. The purpose of the
eight essays in this volume is to place
American policies in a broader context—
or, as Gilbert writes, to recognize that
“the outcome of that war was deter-
mined less at MACV [Military Assis-
tance Command, Vietnam] and
Washington than by the persistence of
the enemy on the battlefield and in po-
litical cultures of the Saigon regime, the
National Liberation Front, and its part-
ners in Hanoi.”
The most original essays in this volume,
by William J. Duiker, George C. Her-
ring, and Robert K. Brigham, pursue as-
pects of this theme. Duiker traces the
efforts of the government in Hanoi “to
manipulate the international and diplo-
matic environment to its own advan-
tage” and its complicated relations with
China and the Soviet Union, allies
whose aid was vital to the North Viet-
namese war effort. Herring emphasizes
the international dimensions of Amer-
ica’s defeat, noting how the inability of
the Lyndon Johnson administration to
gain support from European allies un-
dermined the U.S. war effort. Brigham
challenges the traditional distinction
between northerners and southerners,
arguing that it is misleading to divide
“the struggle along geographical lines
that have no cultural or historical pre-
cedent.” Northerners, he argues, did
not make all of the key decisions in the
war; rather, southerners came to domi-
nate party councils in Hanoi and were
able to convince their northern com-
rades to pursue a more aggressive strat-
egy in the South.
The other five essays focus, with varying
degrees of success, more on the American
side of the war. In a forcefully argued
1 5 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
3
Sullivan et al.: The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
